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I. INTRODUCTION  
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks have become commonplace. A 
DDoS attack is a simultaneous assault on one or more nodes of a computer network, with 
the aim of reducing the availability of computing resources to legitimate users of those 
nodes. For instance, an attacker may use a DDoS attack to exhaust bandwidth, router 
processing capacity, or network stack resources in order to reduce or eliminate network 
connectivity on a targeted portion of the Internet. 
DDoS attack programs vary in terms of technical sophistication, but their effects, 
irrespective of sophistication, can have an adverse effect on the security of a nation state 
or organization, such as first-order effect on electronic commerce and having higher-
order effects on the economic stability of a nation or commercial enterprise.  In other 
words, a simple DDoS attack program used by a script kiddy (i.e., someone with little 
technical expertise who primarily relies on downloading and running attack programs 
written by others) can have as great or greater an impact as a sophisticated attack created 
by information warriors (i.e., military and intelligence personnel conducting information 
operations). 
In order to counter such attacks, one needs to be able to dissect existing attacks to 
understand how they work so that systems can be designed to be more robust to attack, 
one can predict how the vulnerabilities of new or composite systems might be exploited 
by DDoS attackers, and one can assess the potential effects of different types of DDoS 
attacks.  It is not possible to make any system perfectly secure (except for trivial 
systems).  Thus, one needs to be prepared to respond and mitigate likely DDOS-type 
attacks.  One way to accomplish the aforementioned tasks is to model and simulate real-
world, potential, and yet-to-be unleashed DDoS attacks, with the latter to be used by 
information warriors when assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of such attacks from 
an offensive perspective. 
In this thesis we investigate the efficacy of using the Multi-Agent System 
Development Kit (MASDK) [Gorodetsky 2003] to model and simulate DDoS attacks on 
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computer networks. Our objective is to assess the extent to which one can utilize the 
MASDK tool to access the effectiveness of protection mechanisms against DDoS attacks. 
The scope of the thesis is as follows: 
1. Identification of the weakness in a computer network’s protection 
mechanisms, using the MASDK to simulated variants of DDoS attack 
scenarios 
2. Sensitivity analysis on the protection software 
The simulation-based exploration has the following purposes:  
1. Checking a computer network security policy at stages of conceptual 
design and logic design of network security mechanisms. This type of 
checking is performed by simulation of attacks at a macro-level. 
2.  Checking security policy of a real-life computer network. This task is 
performed via simulation of attacks at a micro-level, which is by 
generating network traffic corresponding to the real activity of the 
attackers in the set up of the actual network architecture.      
Our investigation begins with a study of the characteristics of DDoS attacks and 
the types of detection-and-response techniques. It continues with the development of 
attack scenarios and test cases for use in simulation-based experimentation. The 
computation models of the scenarios and test cases are submitted to the MASDK 
simulation engine.    The simulation output from the macro-level simulation can provide 
an overview of the effectiveness of the protection mechanism. Following that, a micro-
level simulation can be carried out to define the more subtle issues in the defense against 
the DDoS attacks. 
Through our research, we observed that DDoS attack varies from the simple 
attack in the form of using e-mail messages to flood a mail server to a more sophisticated 
well-planned attack through infiltration of the network protection system and implant of 
zombies. The latter is a time bomb in the system control by the attacker. It is very 
difficult to defend against the DDoS attack in its first phase (implantation phase) because 
of the wide resources that it can use; the zombies are not necessary in the target network. 
As such, most of the defense concepts focus on the second phase (attack phase) of the 
DDoS attack. The simulation tools available to test such defense concept are limited; they 
mostly require expert labor-intensive manual procedures even in the conceptual design 
phase. The details of the findings will be further elaborated in the report. 
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II. DISTRIBUTED DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACKS 
From 1997 to 2000, DDoS attacks have evolved from a simple one-tier attacks 
(e.g., Ping flood, SYN flood, UDP flood) to the two-tiers attacks (e.g., Smurf attack) 
[Navratilova 2000]. After 2000, attacker found even more ways to accomplish such 
attack by communicating through networks to slave more attack computers.   In this 
chapter, we will describe the phases and structure of the DDoS attack as well as highlight 
some of the recent attacks and their impact to the network users. 
A. WHAT IS DDOS? 
A DDoS attack is a distributed form of denial-of-service attacks. DoS attacks 
consume the resources of a remote host or network by sending large numbers of IP 
packets over a short time period. While a single host can cause significant damage by 
sending packets at its maximum rate, attackers can mount more powerful attacks by 
leveraging the resources of multiple hosts. In a typical DDoS attack, an attacker first 
intrudes into as many hosts as possible and installs two kinds of ‘zombie’ program: 
control program (master zombie) and flooding program (slave zombie). When the 
attacker triggers the master zombies, they order the slave zombies to launch malicious 
traffic towards a target server, thus depriving it of its resources so that it becomes 
unavailable to legitimate users. There are two principal types of DDoS attack: logic 
attacks and flooding attacks [Kashiwa 2002]. 
1. Logic Attacks 
Logic attacks aim to crash the server or starve the server’s system resources, such 
as its CPU utilization, file storage or memory, by exploiting flaws in the server software. 
Common examples of this type of attack include SYN flood, IP Fragmentation Overlap 
and Buffer Overflow [Scambray 2001]. 
2. Flooding Attacks 
In flooding attacks, the attackers do not care what software the victim is using. 
Instead, they simply try to consume all available network bandwidth of the target network 
by bombarding it with massive amounts of traffic. Some of the well-known examples 
include TCP flood, UDP flood, Smurf, Fraggle and ICMP flood [Scambray 2001]. Most 
4 
DDoS attack tools, such as TFN, TFN2K and Stacheldraht, intensify these flooding 
attacks by launching them from multiple sources [Dittrich 2003].   
B. PHASES IN DDOS ATTACK 
According to [Cabrera 2001], the DDoS attacks have two phases, and involve 
three classes of systems. A simplified topology is given in Figure 1. The master system 
coordinates the whole effort. 
 
Figure 1. Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks - A Simplified Topology. 
In the first phase of attack, the master infiltrates multiple computer systems, and 
installs the DDoS attack tools, which are scripts capable of generating large volumes of 
traffic under command from the master. The infiltrated systems are known as the slaves. 
The second phase of attack cannot take place until phase one is completed, that is, the 
local copy of the attack program has a pipeline-type pipe-and-filter architecture. 
The second phase is the actual DDoS attack. Under command from the master, 
the slaves generate network traffic to bring down the target system. Any system 
connected to the network can be a target.  
C. RECENT ATTACKS 
In a recent DDoS attack, the Slammer Worm (sometimes called Sapphire) was 









January 2003, by exploiting buffer-overflow vulnerability in computers on the Internet 
running Microsoft's SQL Server or Microsoft SQL Server Desktop Engine (MSDE) 
2000. Exploiting this vulnerability, the worm infected at least 75000 hosts, perhaps 
considerably more, and caused network outages and unforeseen consequences such as 
canceled airline flights, interference with elections, and ATM failures [Paxson 2003]. 
Slammer's most novel feature is its propagation speed. In approximately three minutes, 
the worm achieved its full scanning rate (more than 55 million scans per second), after 
which the growth rate will slow down because significant portions of the network will 
suffer insufficient bandwidth to accommodate more growth. 
In August 19, 2003 the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released an 
advisory warning user that a variant of Blaster worm, dubbed "nachi," "welchia" or 
"msblast.D," could cause denial-of-service conditions within organizations. The variant 
takes advantage of the same security weakness exploited by the Blaster worm and infects 
only systems that have not been properly patched. After infecting vulnerable Windows 
2000 or Windows XP machines, the new worm then searches for and removes the Blaster 
worm file and attempts to download and install a patch from the Windowsupdate.com 
web site to close the hole. If the patch installation is successful, the worm then 
automatically reboots the systems and promptly begins looking for other machines on the 
network on which to copy itself. The scanning process can flood networks with high 
volumes of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) traffic, causing network 
congestion which can result in denial-of-service conditions [Vijayan 2003].  
DDoS attacks can be launched in many forms. [Jakobsson 2003] shows a “poor-
man” DDoS attack using an email-based attack on selected victims, using only standard 
scripts and agents. For example, in August 2003, the Sobig.F attack program crashed 
email servers around the globe, as well as a few complete enterprise networks. The worm 
infects the computer and scans the files on the hard disk for e-mail addresses. It then uses 
those names as the “From” in new e-mails sent with copies of itself as attachments 
[Cherry 2003].  
In each case, those breakdowns affected emergency services, military readiness, 
retail establishment, and government services. The new generation of DDoS attacks can 
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be sophisticated and stealthy, making it difficult to detect them; this new generation of 
DDoS attacks in some instances even has the capability of covering their tracks.  
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III. PREVENTION, DETECTION AND RESPONSE 
There is no simple answer to the prevention and detection of DDoS attacks. We 
can either defend against the attack in the first phase before the attack deployment is 
completed or isolating the attacking during the second phase. This chapter will give an 
overview of some of the prevention, detection, and response techniques.    
A. PREVENTION, DETECTION AND RESPONSE  
[Cabrera 2001] proposes a methodology for utilizing a Network Management 
System (NMS) for detection of DDoS attacks. The NMS depends on the information 
from MIB (Management Information Base) traffic variables collected from the system 
participating in the attack. Using these datasets, the MIB-based technique renders it 
possible to detect the attack before the Target is shut down. [Mirković 2002] presents a 
similar defense concept known as D-WARD, a DDoS defense system deployed at source-
end networks that autonomously detects and stops attacks originating from these 
networks. The detection algorithm relies on constant monitoring and periodic comparison 
of current system workload with predicted workloads obtained from models of normal 
flow. Any mismatching flows will be rate-limited.  These two methodologies may not be 
able to detect any new forms of attacks that are not captured in the datasets or models.    
Research conducted by some organizations suggests that statistical measurements 
and statistical processing are effective mechanisms for addressing some of the challenges 
of defending against DDoS attacks. [Feinstein 2003] presented a DDoS defense strategy 
by analyzing the live traffic traces from a variety of network environments. The detection 
algorithms (Entropy and Chi-Square Statistic) deduce an attack by measuring the 
statistical properties of anomalies behavior in the packets at various points in the internet. 
The analysis result will be used to target packet-filtering or limiting responses to mitigate 
the effects of DDoS attacks. [Sung 2002] also proposes a technique to filter out DDoS 
traffic to improve the overall throughput of the legitimate traffic. It has the Enhanced 
Probabilistic Marking (EPM) module and Attack Mitigation Decision-making (AMD) 
module scheme to improve the throughput of legitimate traffic during attack, by 
preferentially filtering out traffic that is more likely to come from an attacker than a 
legitimate host.  The main weakness in these strategies is that the responses to the attack 
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take place in the second phase of the attack. That means part of the system operation will 
be degraded and the cleaning up of infected hosts in the network will be tedious and time 
consuming. On top of that the determination of DDoS traffic and legitimate traffic is 
based on probabilities. 
[Kashiwa 2002] proposes a countermeasure against DDoS attacks using a traffic 
control method known as Active Shaping. This approach uses the Active Networking 
Technology incorporates programmability into intermediate network routers that can 
deploy application-level functions to detect, traceback and defend at suitable network 
nodes. Once again the detection of DDoS attack is during the second phase of the attack.  
Most of the detection techniques focus on the event of the second phase of the 
DDoS attack and each has their unique defense features against different form of DDoS 
attacks. To effectively defense against DDoS, we need to detect DDoS attack in its 
deployment phase, which is in the first phase. If the attacks are carried out by highly 
trained attackers, who unlike script-kiddies, continuously customize their existing arsenal 
of attack programs and create new ones in order to both avoid detection and achieve the 
maximum desired effect, we will need detection technique that can detect and construct 
new attack scenarios. [Ning 2002] and [Cuppens 2002] suggested technique in correlating 
intrusion alerts to construct a possible attack scenarios of a bigger attack.  
Most of the responses of the detection techniques can be grouped under three 
main types stated in [Zhao 2001]; (1) Validation of routing devices (filtering), (2) 
Dropping packet with specific characters (mitigating), (3) shutting down the host that 
undergoing attack (isolation). Although D-WARD and Active shaping approaches are 
able to traceback and investigate the source of attack, but the response are meekly 
defending the attack at the nodes. This leaves the attacker to look for vulnerability at 
other area and launch another attack. There is a need for responses that will deter or stop 
the attackers from launching further attack. [Michael 2003] presented a software decoy 
concept that integrates intrusion detection and response to protect critical information 
systems.  
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The study of detection and response techniques is not the purpose of the thesis, 
rather we are looking at a suitable tool to demonstrate and evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of such existing techniques.  
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IV. MASDK SIMULATION TOOL  
Three techniques for performance evaluation stated in [Jain 1991] are analytical 
modeling, simulation and measurement. If it is a new concept, analytical modeling and 
simulation are the only techniques from which to choose. Simulations can incorporate 
more details and require less assumption than analytical modeling and, thus, more often 
the result is closer to reality. This chapter provides an overview of existing DDoS 
simulation tools, the architecture of the MASDK simulation tool and its simulation 
technique.    
A. RELATED WORK  
The most common simulation technique for DDoS attack is to use a DDoS attacks 
tool to carry out a DDoS attack in the simulation network. Some of the tools we were 
able to locate include Stacheldraht [Dittrich 1999a], Tribe Flood Network (TFN or 
TFN2K), and trinoo [Dittrich 1999b]. 
[Sterne 2002] used the Stacheldraht v4 attack tool to generate UDP and ICMP 
flood, TCP SYN floods, and Smurf attacks as part of simulation. The technique in 
evaluating the defense is still based on expert labor-intensive manual procedures by 
networks administrators. A network needs to be setup to collect data while the attack is 
carried out.  
The simulation methodology in [Sung 2002] uses CAIDA (Cooperative 
Association for Internet Data Analysis) and Cheswick’s Topology dataset. CAIDA and 
Cheswick’s Topology dataset are network probing tools for measuring forward IP paths, 
measuring round-trip time, tracking persistent routing changes, and visualizing network 
connectivity. Similar to the methodology used by [Sterne 2002], it requires the user to set 
up a target network in order to perform the simulation. 
The primary weakness in these approaches is labor intensive manual procedures 
that involve. MASDK provides another type of simulation platform that allows the design 
to be tested on a single PC before an actual network is required. The following section 
will provide some details on the MASDK tool. 
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B. GENERALIZED ARCHITECTURE OF ATTACK SIMULATOR 
PROTOTYPE 
The software prototype for computer network attack simulation is built as a multi-
agent system that uses two classes of agents. The agent of the first class simulates defense 
system of the attacked computer network (“Network Agent”) and the second one 
simulates a hacker performing attack against computer network (“Hacker Agent”). In the 
developed prototype each agent class has single instance although the developed 
technology makes it possible to simulate a team of hackers and a team of agents 
responsible for computer network security.  
The aforementioned agents are implemented on the basis of the technology 
supported by Multi-Agent System Development Kit (MASDK) that is a multi-agent 
software tool aiming at support of the design and implementation of multi-agent systems 
of a broad range [Kotenko 2003a]. The developed and implemented simulator comprises 
the multitude of reusable components generated by use of the MASDK standard 
functionalities and application-oriented software components developed manually in 
terms of programming language MS Visual C++ 6.0 SP 5. Figure 2 illustrates the general 
prototype architecture.  
Each agent operates using the respective fragment of the application ontology that 
is designed by use of an editor of MASDK facilities. The interaction between agents in 
the process of attack simulation is supported by the communication environment, which 
design and implementation is also supported by MASDK. 
It is worthy to note that the first version of the prototype was implemented as a 
system that consisted of a single agent simulating a hacker's activity whereas computer 
network security system was simulated as a reactive system. In such architecture, it is not 
necessary to situate both attacking Hacker Agent and computer network security reactive 
system in a communication environment. In the first version of the prototype, the 
communication component plays a very important role. Indeed, the knowledge bases of 
Network Agent and Hacker Agent are implemented as two separate entities. An 
advantage of such a knowledge representation makes it possible to simulate adversary 
interactions. Such a model adequately implements interaction of both the above entities. 
In it, while simulating an attack in order to either obtain response providing it with the 
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needed information (on the reconnaissance stage) or to perform an attack action (on the 
threat realization stage - Hacker Agent sends a certain message to the Network Agent). 
The Network Agent, as in real-life interactions, analyzes the received message and forms 
a responsive message. This message is formed based on the Network Agent's knowledge 
base that represents the network configuration and all its attributes needed to simulate 
real-life response. The Network Agent's knowledge base also uses information about 
possible existing attacks and provides reaction on them. 
 
Figure 2. General Architecture of Attack Simulator. 
The key components of both agents correspond to so-called kernels that are the 
modules written in C++ and compiled into a dll file. These components provide interface 
between the part of the software written in C++ and the components implemented 
through the use of MASDK. The kernels provide interfaces to the respective fragments of 
the application ontology, and initialize the state machines, which in turn execute their 
scripts. 
Let us consider the main components of the Hacker Agent. The component model 
of the Hacker Agent is shown in Figure 3. It comprises the following main components:  
1. The core (Agent Hacker Kernel)  
2.  Fragment of the application domain ontology  
3.  State machines model  
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4.  Scripts 
5.  Attack task specification component  
6.  Probabilistic (stochastic) decision-making model with regard to the further 
actions 
7.  Network traffic generator  
8.  Visualization component of the attack scenario development  
 
Figure 3. Component Model of the Hacker Agent. 
The kernel of the Hacker Agent (Hacker.dll) contains a standard set of functions 
require for exploiting the ontology and running state machines. It is also provided with 
functions that call specification of attack task, compute next state-machine transition as 
well as initiate and perform visualization of the attack development.  
Fragment of the application domain ontology specifies a set of notions and 
attributes used by the Hacker Agent.  
The state machines model component is used for specification of the Hacker 
Agent behavior including decision-making mechanism used by the Hacker Agent for 
choosing the next action to perform. It is built on the basis of attribute stochastic 
grammars, and consists of over fifty nested state machines.  
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The script component specifies the set of scripts that can be performed by the 
Hacker Agent's state machines.  
The attack task specification component provides user with interfaces require for 
specifying attack attributes.   
A probabilistic decision-making model is used to determine the Hacker Agent's 
further actions in attack generation.  
Network traffic generator is used to form the flow of network packets for several 
classes of attack directed to the hosts according to the attack specification. This 
component is initiated through calling the particular kernel function of the scripts of those 
states, for which the network traffic has to be generated. 
Visualization component of the attack scenario development is used for visual 
representation of the attack progress, corresponding to each action of the attacker and 
respective responses from the Network Agent. The responses may be effective (i.e., the 
attack action was successful in part or in full), or ineffective (i.e., no response message, 
or the message saying that the attack was blocked by the firewall). 
 
Figure 4. Component Model of the Network Agent. 
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Let us consider the main components of the Network Agent. It is depicted in 
Figure 4. They are as follows:  
1. The core (Network Agent Kernel)  
2. Fragment of the application domain ontology  
3. State machines model component  
4. Scripts component 
5. Network configuration specification component  
6. Firewall model (implementation) component 
7. Generator of the network’s response to attack action 
Network Agent Kernel (NetAgent.dll) contains the standard set of functions for 
processing the application domain ontology and the state machine model, as well as the 
functions used to specify the network configuration through the user interface, the 
firewall model initialization, and the computation of the network’s response to an 
attacking action.  
Fragment of the application domain ontology determines a set of notions and 
attributes used by the Network Agent.  
State machines model of the Network Agent's specifies its behavior. This state 
machines model mostly performs communication functionality. It specifies the actions 
corresponding to the receiving of incoming message, classification, processing, and 
sending the response.  
The scripts component specifies a set of scripts initialized from the state machines 
model of the Network Agent.  
The network configuration specification component is used for the specification 
of a set of user interfaces for the description and configuration of the network to be 
attacked. All the notions and attributes that pertain to the networks and hosts, including 
the notions and attributes that describe firewalls, are described through these interfaces.  
Firewall model (implementation) component is used to determine the firewall’s 
response to the action generated by the Hacker Agent. Each incoming message from the 
Hacker Agent that constitutes an attack action is entered into the firewall model, which is 
assigned to the entire network (in imitation of a network firewall) or (and) the host (in 
imitation of a personal firewall). In the event of an attack is blocked by the firewall, the 
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response message formed by the Network Agent contains the information about the 
attack that has been blocked by a specific firewall.  
The generator of the network’s response to the attack actions is used for the 
generation of the responses (messages) according to the type attack action. It is initialized 
through the corresponding function exported by the agent’s kernel after the Hacker Agent 
has successfully overcome a firewall. 
C. SIMULATION OF DDOS USING MASDK  
In Chapter III, we have discussed various techniques and tools that developed to 
detect and defeat DDoS attacks. However, the DDoS attackers constantly modify their 
DDoS programs to exploit newly discovered vulnerabilities in the protection 
mechanisms, user applications, middleware, and operating systems. In order to combat 
DDoS, one needs to develop a strong theoretical basis upon which to harden information 
systems and infrastructures so they can survive such attacks. 
In the beginning of this chapter, we mentioned two types of methods for 
simulation and testing the system that under DDoS attack. Most of these simulation 
methods required labor intensive manual setup even at conceptual design phase. To test a 
protection mechanism for various network infrastructure is too resource consuming.  
MASDK supports two levels of simulation, namely the macro-level and micro-
level. 
1. Macro-level Simulation 
In macro-level simulation, the simulation can be run in a standalone PC. The 
conceptual design of the protected network and the attacker capabilities can be input into 
the database of the "Network Agent" and "Hacker Agent" using the Microsoft Access. 
Figure 5 shows an example of the database file capturing the details of the protected 
network. 
The user is required to enter the values of the tables in order for the simulation to 
produce a realistic result. For example, the user needs to specify whether the firewall is 
network-firewalls or host-firewalls and the probability of blocking undesired traffic and 
so on. The properties of the protective mechanism deployed in the network can be 
specified in this database. On the hand, the user can also specify the capabilities of the 
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attacker, examples which are the networks that the attacker has gained trusted 
relationship. 
  Figure 5. Database of network properties used in simulation 
2. Micro-level Simulation 
Micro-level simulation allows the user to setup part of the network for more 
details simulation and testing. The actual protective mechanisms (e.g. firewalls, tripwire, 
IDS, etc) can be deployed in the physical network and the MASDK simulation tool can 
be used to carried out the DDoS attack activities. Each of the activity can be carried out 
individually or combined as a sequence of events. In this mode, it allows more interactive 
simulation, the user is able to observer the behavior of the protective mechanism in the 
network. 
3. Simulating the DDoS Attack 
In Chapter II, we mentioned that there are two phases in a DDoS attacks. To 
prevent the launch of an attack, we must be able to stop it during the first phase. 
Otherwise we are only able to minimize the damage in phase two of the attack. The 
MASDK simulation tool breaks down the simulation of phase one of DDoS attack into 
twelve attack activities as listed in Table 1 [Kotenko 2003b]. 
The attack activities can be carried out as independent events or combine as a 
sequence of events during the simulation. Other hacking software (e.g., password 
cracking programs) can be integrated with MASDK to enhance the realism of the attacker 
capability. The attacker real or spoofed IP address can be specified in the simulation to 
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test the protection against such attack. Figure 6 shows one of the user interface menu for 
specifying the attack scenario.    
 




Class Number Designation Interpretation 
1 IH Identification of Hosts 
2 IS Identification of Services 
3 IO Identification of OS 
4 RE Shared resources enumeration 









6 ABE Applications and banners enumeration 
7 GAR Get access to resources of the host 
8 EP Escalating Privilege with regard to the host 
resources 
9 CVR Confidentiality violation realization 
10 IVR Integrity violation realization 


















12 CBD Creating back doors 
Table 1 List of attack activities (From: Kotenko 2003b) 
During the simulation, the attack activities will be carried based on the attack 
scenario created. MASDK will feedback to the user whether the attack activities are 




V. TEST SUITE - TEST CASES AND SCENARIOS   
The best way to learn the response and behavior is to apply the concepts to a real 
system. This is specially true of computer systems performance evaluation because even 
though the techniques appear simple on the surface, their application to the real systems 
offer a different experience since the real systems do not behave in a simple manner. The 
test scenarios in this chapter are developed to study and analysis the dynamic behavior of 
the network protection mechanism defense against the DDoS attack. The results obtained 
will be used in the analysis in the Chapter VI. 
A. TEST SCENARIO 1  
The server in the network is providing services to both its local hosts as well as 
the remote hosts (e.g. customer, employee) through the internet. The attacker prepared 
and launched a DDoS attack on the Server from providing the service. 
 
Figure 7. Network Architecture of Test Scenario 1. 
1. Test Case 1: Direct Attack on Server 
Attacker infiltrates the network, gain access to the local hosts (need not be all) 
and launched a direct attack on the server. The attacker will carry out the following five 
general attack activities. 
Reconnaissance: Use open sources to gain available information about the 
network. Useful information includes phone numbers, postal addresses, internet 









etc. Reconnaissance agent gathers information from a variety of servers on the internet 
like, 
 1. Ping to check whether any of the host is alive (connected). 
 2. Do a DNS look up to map domain names to IP addresses 
 3. Do a DNS zone transfer and grab all information available about a 
 particular domain. 
 4. Look up IP block registration to analyze the IP address range assigned to a 
 given organization. 
 5. Trace-route to determine the list of routers between the source and 
 destination.   
Scanning: Using the information gather from the reconnaissance, the attacker will 
scan the network systems for vulnerabilities. Employ scanning agent to, 
 1. Search for modems that are connected using the range of phone numbers 
 gathered. 
 2. Develop a network map of the target network to define the network 
 topology. 
 3. Conduct port scan to determine open ports that indicated the types of 
 service (e.g. type of OS) which are running. 
 4. Scan for vulnerabilities like misconfigurations, unpatched systems with 
 known vulnerabilities, etc. 
Gaining Access: There are many ways to gain access to the target network, the 
gain_access agent can, 
 1. Manipulate poorly written software. 
 2. Exploit weak password storage mechanisms. 
 3. Gather data that is not properly encrypted such as userIDs and passwords.   
Maintaining access: After gaining access to the system, gain_access agent can 
maintain the access by utilize Trojan Horse and Backdoor techniques to hide its presence 
on the system and guarantee future access. These backdoors can be created in three 
levels,  
 1. Application-level Backdoors - install malicious application into the system 
 2. Traditional RootKits - modify existing programs on the system.  
 3. Kernel-level RootKits - modify the kernel of the system itself.  
Covering the Tracks: The master and slave zombies must be installed without 
being detected by the protective mechanism in the host or the network. The stealth agent 
is employed to carry out: 
 1. File Hiding to hide the malicious program in the system (host or server). 
 2. Protocol Tunneling to hide the data moving across the network by 
 carrying one protocol on top of another. 
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 3. Covert Channels to hide data inside the openings of a protocol (e.g. the 
 TCP header).  
Once the deployment phase of DDoS attack is completed, attacker will launch an 
attack remotely through the internet.  
Protective Mechanisms available include: 
1. Intrusion detection system 
2. Firewall 
3. File integrity checking software (e.g. Tripwire) 
4. Anti-virus software 
5. Configuration management 
• Implement non-executable system stack to prevent buffer overflow 
attack. 
• Keep the system with up to date patches. 
• Identify users with weak password. 
• Shut off unwanted services (e.g. Telnet) that have inherent security 
weaknesses. 
• Close unused port. 
• Audit usage of system. 
The simulation and analysis will include the following: 
Run 1: Using the MASDK tool to attack the network without any protective 
mechanism. At micro-level simulation with the setup of actual network, we will examine 
how fast the MASDK tool can infiltrate the network and set the backdoor at the hosts. 
Run 2: Using the MASDK tool to attack the network that has protection 
mechanism 1 to 4. At micro-level simulation with the setup of actual network, we will 
examine the following, 
1. Is the IDS in the network able to recognize the attack signature? 
2. Is the type of firewall (e.g. stateful or proxy firewall) and firewall 
configuration able to block the attack? 
3. Is the file integrity checking software able to detect the insertion and 
modification of the files in the system? 
4. Is the anti-virus software help in defending the system again such attack?  
The protective mechanisms need to be set at different configurations to produce 
the best result.  
Run 3: In addition to the protective mechanisms in Run 2, the network is further 
hardened with the configuration management. This will help to examine how effective by 
doing a proper network configuration defend against DDoS attack.  
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2. Test Case 2: Spoof as Remote Hosts to Attack the Server 
In order to launch an effective DDoS, the attacker must control enough zombies 
to execute the attack. If the number of infected hosts is not sufficient, the attacker will 
spoof as numerous remote hosts to attack the Server. 
The attack will still require to carry out the five general attack activities 
(reconnaissance, scanning, gaining access, maintaining access and covering the tracks) to 
gain enough information to spoof as legitimate hosts. 
The available protective mechanism will be the same in Test Case 1.  
The simulation and analysis will include the following: 
Run 1: Using the MASDK tool to attack the network without any protective 
mechanism. We will examine how fast the MASDK tool can gain information of the 
system and spoof the network as a remote legitimate host. 
Run 2: Using the MASDK tool to attack the network that has all available 
protection mechanisms. At micro-level simulation with the setup of actual network, we 
will examine the following, 
1. Is the authentication system effective against the attack?  
2. Is the IDS in the network able to recognize the attack signature? 
3. Is the Firewall configuration able to block the attack? 
The protective mechanisms need to be set at different configurations to produce 
the best result.  
3. Test Case 3: Attack Other Vulnerabilities of the Network 
Instead of attacking the server of the network that providing the services, we will 
attack the weakness in such network architecture.  
The attack will still require to carry out the five general attack activities 
(reconnaissance, scanning, gaining access, maintaining access and covering the tracks) to 
gain enough information to spoof as legitimate hosts. 
The available protective mechanism will be the same in Test Case 1.  
The simulation and analysis will include the following: 
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Run 1: Using the MASDK tool to attack the network router. This will deny 
services provide by the server to the remote legitimate hosts. We shall examine how to 
modify the network architecture to overcome such attack and the resources that require. 
B. TEST SCENARIO 2 
In Scenario 1, the network does not have layers of protection mechanism. All 
systems within the network are protected by the same firewall or IDS. In most 
application, the network will like to separate untrusted users on the DMZ networks. DMZ 
(De-Militarized Zone) a "neutral zone" between a company's private network and the 
outside public network. For example, packet filtering might allow HTTP from the 
Internet to reach the DMZ but prohibit telnet, finger, and other protocols that might easily 
allow an attack on your trusted networks to be launched.  
It is not necessary that this network architecture is more secure than the one in 
Scenario 1. However, this architecture is closer to the set up of an actual network. 
 
Figure 8. Network Architecture of Test Scenario 2. 
 
1. Test Case 1: Direct Attack on Server 
Attacker infiltrates the network, gain access to the local hosts and launched a 
direct attack on the server. The attacker will carry out the five general attack activities on 
the target network. 
Protective Mechanism Available 














3. File integrity checking software (e.g. Tripwire) 
4. Anti-virus software 
5. Configuration management 
The simulation and analysis will include the following: 
Run 1: Using the MASDK tool to attack the Database Server. At micro-level 
simulation with the setup of actual network, we will examine the following, 
1. Is the IDS in the network able to recognize the attack signature? 
2. Is the type of firewall (e.g. stateful or proxy firewall) and firewall 
configuration able to block the attack? 
3. Is the file integrity checking software able to detect the insertion and 
modification of the files in the system? 
4. Is the anti-virus software help in defending the system again such attack?  
Run 2: With more security resources, we will examine the following, 
1. Given more IDS sensors, how should the IDS sensors deploy to enhance 
the detection?  
2. If another Firewall is employed between the router and DMZ, does it 
improve the defense against the attack? What should be the configuration 
of the two firewalls?  
2. Test Case 2: Direct Attack on Server 
This test case is similar to Test Case 2 in Scenario 1 with different network 
architecture. 
The simulation and analysis will include the following: 
Run 1: Using the MASDK tool to attack the network that has all available 
protection mechanisms. We will examine the following, 
1. Is the authentication system effective against the attack?  
2. Is the IDS in the network able to recognize the attack signature? 
3. Is the Firewall configuration able to block the attack? 
Run 2: With more security resources, we will examine the following, 
1. Given more IDS sensors, how should the IDS sensors deploy to enhance 
the detection? The deployment of sensors may be different from Test Case 
1 for best result.  
2. If another Firewall is employed between the router and DMZ, does it 
improve the defense against the attack? What should be the configuration 




3. Test Case 3: Attack Other Vulnerabilities of the Network 
This test case is similar to Test Case 3 in Scenario 1 with different network 
architecture. 
The simulation and analysis will include the following: 
Run 1: Using the MASDK tool to attack the network router. This will deny 
services provide by the server to the remote legitimate hosts. We shall examine how to 
modify the network architecture to overcome such attack and the resources that require. 
C. TEST SCENARIO 3 
Network A and Network B is business partner, therefore they have a trusted 
relationship. The server in Network A is the target of the attack. Network A has a much 
stronger security setup than Network B. Attacker explore the weakness in Network B and 
use it as the platform to launch the DDoS attack.  
Figure 9. Network Architecture of Test Scenario 3. 
1. Test Case 1: Attack on Server in Network A Using Network B 
Resources 
Attacker infiltrates Network B, gain access to the local hosts (need not be all) and 
launched a DDoS attack on the server of Network A. The attacker will carry out the five 













Protective Mechanism Available 
1. Intrusion detection system 
2. Firewall 
3. File integrity checking software (e.g. Tripwire) 
4. Anti-virus software 
5. Configuration management 
The simulation and analysis will include the following: 
Run 1: Using the MASDK tool to take over the systems in Network B as zombies. 
Once the zombies are successfully install in Network B, the attack will make use of the 
trusted relationship to launch the DDoS attack on the server of Network A. We shall 
examine the whether the protection mechanism in Network A is able to detect the 
increase in network traffic between Network A and Network B.  
Run 2: Employ a few more similar networks like Network B. Instead of using 
only the zombies in Network B, the attacker distributes the attack zombies over a few 
networks. We shall examine whether this form of attack are more stealthy as compare to 
Run 1.  
2. Test Case 2: Attack Other Vulnerabilities of the Network 
Instead of attacking the server of the network that providing the services, we will 
attack the weakness in such network architecture. 
The simulation and analysis will include the following: 
Run 1: Using the MASDK tool to attack the network router using Network B 
resources. This will deny services provide by the server to the remote legitimate hosts. 
We shall examine how to modify the network architecture to overcome such attack and 
the resources that require. 
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VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
 [Kotenko 2003a] states that the experiments conducted with the MASDK can be 
performed at the macro- or micro-level. Macro-level simulation for checking a computer 
network security policy at stages of conceptual and logic design of a network security 
system and micro-level for checking the security policy of the real-life computer 
network. However the present version of MASDK is only capable of simulating an attack 
at the macro-level with the limitation stated in Chapter VII. The results of the simulation 
are shown in Appendix B. In this chapter we present our analysis of the results obtained 
from the simulation. 
A. INSTALLATION AND OPERATION OF THE SIMULATION TOOL 
The instruction on installation and operation of the attack simulator is in 
Appendix A. There are four points that the user should be aware before using the 
software. 
First, in addition to the installation and operation instruction that attaches with the 
software, the system requires Microsoft MS Studio Library to operate. The Microsoft MS 
Studio Library can be easily set up by installing any of the software in Microsoft MS 
Studio (e.g. Visual C++, Visual Basic). If the library is not installed, the user will 
experience error message on missing dll file during the execution of the program. 
Second, in the present version of the simulation tool, the user may realize that the 
simulation ‘hangs’ after a few attack activities. The user should check the option ‘save 
preceding attack realization’ on the screen shown on Figure 6 for all simulations. This 
will allow the user to exit from the simulation if it hangs and continue the sequence of 
attack by re-entering the simulator with the same input parameters. 
Third, the simulation will take as short as thirty-five minutes to achieve the attack 
objective for a network without any protection mechanism. A system with protection 
mechanisms can run as long as eight hours or more for multiple iterations before ‘the end 
of attack’ message is received when the attack activities in Table 1 are not successful. 
However the interval between each activity should not be more than three minutes, else 
the system is likely in the ‘hang’ state.  
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Lastly, the simulation result obtained in the ‘Attack Scenario Realization’ screen 
(see Figure 11) is not able to export to another file or save; therefore the user should copy 
the result screen to another file manually before exiting the program.   
B. TEST SCENARIO 1  
In this scenario, the network architecture is simplified to test and observe the 
behavior and characteristics of the MASDK simulation tool. The support for modeling 
the protection mechanisms is limited to a firewall at the network level for the present 
version of the MASDK simulation tool. 
1. Test Case 1: Direct Attack on Server 
Due to the limitations in the current version of the MASDK simulation tool, we 
were only able to perform Run 1 and Run 2.   
In Run 1 with no protection mechanism, the Hacker Agent is able to carry out all 
the attack activities smoothly. The simulation took thirty-five minutes from 
reconnaissance to complete installation of backdoors and covering up its tracks. The 
result obtained is not surprising: in real-life, if the network has no protection at all, an 
attacker will require little or no effort to take over the control of the computer systems 
present in the network.  
In Run 2 with a network Firewall (set Probability at 0.9), there are total three runs 
with average of five hours per run. In the first two runs, the Hacker Agent is not 
successful in the attack: all attack activities are blocked by the firewall. In the third run 
the Hacker Agent has tried numerous attempts to gather information of the target 
network, and from screen 3 onwards the Hacker Agent is able to identify the services that 
are available on the network systems. The reconnaissance result gives the Hacker Agent 
the opportunity to install three backdoors on the network systems. This is true to real-life 
applications, in which the configuration of the firewall will change during different 
phases of an operation. For example, the firewall can be temporarily configured to allow 
Telnet for remote configuration or FTP for transferring of data. The attacker will 
periodically check the target network for such opportunities to deliver its attack payload. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The present version of MASDK simulator places artificial limitations on 
simulating the real-world DDoS attacks. Here we will highlight our recommendations for 
improving the toolkit.   
A.  TYPES OF DDOS ATTACKS 
There are two general types of DDoS attacks as (c.f., Chapter II): logic and 
flooding attacks. In the simulator, the DDoS attack is limited to phase one of the flooding 
attack. The user is not able to specify the type of attack. Furthermore, there are many 
forms of flooding attacks, each of which may require different defense strategies. In 
recent years, DDoS attacks have become even more sophisticated; for instance, the 
Sobig.F and MS Blast have developed unique defenses. For example, one of these 
defenses causes infected computers to reboot themselves every ten minutes which is 
faster than any software can be downloaded to install a fix [Cherry 2003].  
Typically the DDoS attack depends on two properties: (i) the size of attack 
packets and (ii) the multiplying speed. The larger the attack packet, the higher the impact 
will be on the traffic congestion on the network. However, a small attack packet is more 
likely to get through the packet filtering but require a much higher multiplying speed to 
achieve the same impact.  
 The weaknesses and strengths of a protection mechanism can only be truly 
validated if various properties, types, and forms of attack can be built into the simulator.  
B. SIMULATING THE ACTUAL NETWORK TRAFFIC 
The element in the simulator that requires modification is the network traffic. The 
traffic flows in any network are analogous to human keystrokes: each has its unique 
pattern of behavior. The user must be able to program and control the network behavior 
and traffic density of the network for specific network architectures in order to observe 
the impact caused by the attack. Network behavior includes the type of messages (i.e., 
broadcast, unicast, or multi-cast) and varies with traffic density over time. Traffic density 
is the measure of the load versus the bandwidth. The simulator must be robust enough to 
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simulate the network traffic density and network behavior in order to obtain an accurate 
simulation result. 
C. VARIOUS NETWORK ARCHITECTURES 
Although the present version of MASDK simulator can simulate the DDoS attack 
at macro-level in a standalone PC, it still requires the programmer assistant to change the 
network architecture. There should be a tool (e.g., GUI) for the user to build the network 
for simulation. This will give the user more flexibility during the design phase and a 
better view of both the strengths and weaknesses of different network architecture in the 
simulation-and-analysis phase. 
D. SIMULATING THE PROTECTION MECHANISM 
There are various commercial-available network protection elements such as 
firewalls, intrusion-detection systems, and tripwires. These elements can have various 
configurations or types for different protection requirements. A firewall can be stateful or 
proxy firewall, or it can be configured to block certain network protocols (e.g., ICMP or 
Telnet). An IDS can have host- or network-based sensors. The present version of the 
MASDK simulation tool is only capable of simulating a firewall. The library for 
protection mechanism needs to be expanded in order to permit macro-level simulation of 
real-world protection mechanisms and security policies.   
E. SIMULATING THE TWO PHASES OF DDOS ATTACK 
In Chapter II, we mentioned that DDoS attacks are comprised of two phases: (i) 
the implantation phase and (ii) launching of the attack phase. The version of MASDK 
used in the study is limited to simulation for the implantation phase. Although this gives 
the advantage in studying the behavior of the attacker and the attack strategy, it is not 
able to demonstrate the impact and degree of damage in such attack. 
F. DOCUMENTATION OF MASDK SIMULATOR    
The MASDK simulator still in the research phase, as such there is no user manual 
or guide in using the tool. A good documentation will help both the designer and user on 




DDoS attack is evolving at a rapid and alarming rate; an effective solution must 
be formulated using an adaptive approach. Most of the simulations are performed at the 
attack phase of the DDoS attack; thus the defense techniques developed focus mainly on 
filtering and isolating the attack. We observed that the attackers, besides constantly 
advancing their attacking skill, also develop an array of defense strategies against the 
countermeasures. The anti-virus software, firewalls or IDS will need to be empowered 
with a similar capability in order to be effective against the DDoS attacks: the defense 
strategy must be able to adapt to changes. Defending against the attack in its implantation 
phase will likely prove to be more effective in the future.  
In order to develop and verify the effectiveness of a defense strategy, we needed a 
robust and flexible simulation tool. MASDK simulation tool provided us a means to 
generate DDoS attack in a safe experimental environment for testing and validating 
security solutions, starting from the implantation phase: this allows researchers to 
develop new defense strategy even before the DDoS attack is launched. However, the 
study shows that MASDK development is still in its infancy. The result obtained from the 
simulation is static and does not show the robustness and complexity of the DDoS attack. 
To have a more realistic, interactive and dynamic simulation, modification is required on 
the hacker agent and network agent to model various types and forms of DDoS attack in 
addition to the network traffic and network architecture.  
Nevertheless, the MASDK simulation tool has laid a foundation and gives a head 
start in modeling the DDoS attack right at the beginning of the attack. The two levels of 
simulation (macro-level and micro-level) also minimize the amount of resources required 
to verify the concept of any defense strategy or mechanism. The MASDK simulation tool 
can be further developed to include more agents as mentioned in [Gorodetsky 2003] to 





































This appendix contains the instruction on installation and operation with Attack 
Simulator (in the environment MASDK 2.1). 
System requirements:  
1. OS Windows 2000 (with SP3) or XP (with SP1) 
2. free disk space - 50 Mb  
3. minimum of operation memory - 128 Mb 
4. Presence of the established TCP/IP package (As a rule, it is automatically 
installed together with OS) 
5. Presence of established driver Access ODBC (As a rule, it is automatically 
installed together with OS and MS Office) 
Necessary additional software (on the disk): 
1. Java Run Time Environment, version - 1.4.1_01 or higher (File j2re-
1_4_2-win.exe of the distribution kit is on the disk). 
2. MS XML, version - 4.0 or higher (File SP1.msi of the distribution kit is on 
the disk). 
Sequence of actions on installation:  
1. Copy catalogue MAS4 with all subdirectories to disk C.  
2. Start the file C:\MAS4\Generic_agent\Server\server.bat  
3. Start the file C:\MAS4\Generic_agent\Server\portal.bat 1 
4. Select the item of the menu “File Æ Start Agents” in window “AIL 
Registry” or press the button . After this two agents “MainHack” and 
“MainNet” will be installed 2 
5. Press the button  in the appeared affiliated window “Agent MainHack” 
of the window “AILab Agent Library :: Portal Component”. As a result an 
user interface of hacker agent will be installed  
                                                 
1 It is doesn’t matter in which order to start the files “server.bat” and “portal.bat”. As a result four 
windows will appear, including windows “AIL Registry” and “AILab Agent Library :: Portal Component”  
2 As a result under successful installation of agents the following information will appear in window 
“AILRegistry”:  
Added New Agent MainNet 
Returning current agent information… 
Returning current agent information to new agent… 
Added New Agent MainHack 
Returning current agent information… 
Returning current agent information to new agent… 
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6. Select “Attack Description” in the appeared window “Predefined Actions” 
and press the button “Use”. As a result the window “Specify The Attack” 
will appear as in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10. Window for Specifying the Attack. 
The settings of the Hacker Agent include the following elements:  
 Real IP-address – Hacker Agent’s real IP address. This field is mandatory. It 
is necessary for determining the attack scenario on both macro-level and 
micro-level (for forming network packets on the level of TCP/IP protocol 
stack);  
 Spoofed IP-address – Hacker Agent’s spoofed IP address. This field is not 
mandatory, unless attacks have to be generated on micro-level;  
 Password file – path to the file with a list of words for guessing the password. 
This file is used only in generating attacks “Password Guessing” (PG) and 
“Password Cracking” (PC) on micro-level;  
 Save preceding attack realization – the tag that determines whether the results 
of the previous attacks will be saved. When this parameter is initialized, the 
attack specified by this component will be executed using the knowledge base 
formed in the previous realizations of attacks (not necessarily with the same 
intentions). All logs and traces are also saved in this case;  
 Generate attacks on net protocol level – the tag that determines whether the 
attack will be generated on macro-level. When this parameter is initialized, 
besides the simulation of attack on macro-level, network packets are 
generated on the level of TCP/IP protocols stack. 
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In the given debugging version an updating of the information, known to the 
agent - hacker (button “Define Known Information”) is blocked.  
The used initial data allow carrying out attacks for 12 classes of intentions at the 
macro-level.  
For micro-level simulation of attacks it is necessary to set the real IP-address of 
an attacked host or a network. In the given version it is carried out directly through a 
hacker’s database (file “MainHack.mdb”). 
7. Press the button “OK” in window “Specify The Attack”. As a result a 
process of attack simulation will be installed. It will be visualized as 
shown in Figure 11.  
 
 
Figure 11. Attack Scenario Realization. 
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The presented window depicts the fragment of attack development for the 
intention 7 (“Getting Access to Resources (GAR)”), where the hacker’s IP-address is 
161.43.201.148 and the host IP-address is 210.122.25.16.  
In this window the information about attack is divided on the following four 
groups:  
 the attack task specification units are mapped in the left top of the screen;  
 to the right of them the attack generation tree is visualized;  
 the strings of generated malefactor’s actions are placed in the left part of the 
screen below the attack task specification;  
 on the right of each malefactor’s action a tag of success (failure) and data 
obtained from an attacked host (a host response) are depicted.  
The Attack task specification section contains the information generated by the 
component of the attack task specification.  
The graph showing the Attack generation tree represents a hierarchy of the 
malefactor’s intentions and actions of different levels which correspond to non-terminal 
and terminal nodes. The non-terminal high level nodes are depicted by white ellipses. 
The terminal nodes of the attack model correspond to blue nodes. The brown node is the 
node of the current step of an attack scenario execution.  
The transcriptions of the blue nodes can be seen in the section “Current non-
terminal node”.  
All non-terminal nodes are realized as state machines.  
When the attack scenario is been developed the strings with the following 
elements are appeared in the white window:  
 Braun strings in left part of the diagram are descriptions of the generated 
terminal malefactor’s actions.  
 The result of each malefactor’s action may be positive or negative. If the 
result is positive, the square block (designating the tag of success) is green, 
and green comments are printed from the right of the square block. The 
negative result means that the action was done unsuccessfully. The negative 
result is possible in two cases: if the attack is blocked by a firewall (in that 
case, the indicator and the comment are red); if the network response is 
negative (the indicator is grey, the comment is absent). When the string 
“END: Attack is over” is appeared, this means that a scenario realization is 
finished.  
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As shown in Figure 11, in the network attack implementation, each terminal 
action is performed on each host of the network, and in case of success or the attack 
being blocked by the firewall, right after the square block is the IP address of the host at 
which that terminal attack action was directed.  
In case of success, the comment contains the decoding of the result obtained 
through that terminal action of the Hacker Agent, and the information obtained from the 
Network Agent as a result of the attacker’s action (that information may be absent).  
In case of the hacker’s attack being blocked, the comment contains information 
on the reasons of the attack being blocked (either an illegal IP address of sender or 
receiver was detected, or the specified attack signature was detected), as well as the name 
of the firewall. If the attack was blocked on the level of the network firewall, then the IP 
address of the network is placed at the start of the comment.  
After completion of the attack scenario the message “END: Attack is over” 
appears in the right part of the white window.  
It is possible to look through the scenario tree by moving between the strings on 
the diagram.  
The current scenario realization can be finished by closing the main dialog 
window. After that it is possible to begin another scenario.  
Lastly, to stop an operation of agents it is necessary to press the button of an 
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APPENDIX B 
This appendix contains the results of Test Case 1 in Test Scenario 1. 
Scenario 1 
Test Case 1 - Run 1:  
The MASDK tool is used to attack the network without any protective 
mechanism. At micro-level simulation with the setup of actual network, we will examine 




Screen 1: We can observe that the attacker is doing a reconnaissance on the target 




Screen 2: This screen shows that the attacker is doing a port scan on systems of 
the target network. The attacker has also succeeded in gaining access to the systems of 








Screen 3: Shows that the attacker has succeeded in installing the backdoors on the 
target systems for future access and at the same time covering the track of the attack.  
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Test Case 1 - Run 2:  
This test case is utilizing the MASDK tool to attack the network that has installed 
with protection mechanism 1 to 4. In the present version of MASDK simulation tool only 
the network Firewall is available.  
 
 
Screen 1: There is no response from the network to the attack activities that 





Screen 2: The Firewall is able to block most of the attack activities. The Hacker 
Agent has succeeded in identifying the services run in some of the network systems.   
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Screen 4: The Hacker Agent tried other form of attack to gather information but 


















Screen 8: The Hacker Agent has obtained the password of the network systems. 
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Screen 9: The Hacker Agent has successfully installed two backdoors in the 
network in the whole attack realization.  
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